

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1970

TO: Henry Kissinger


FROM: John Mitchell



RE: Attached

In case the party writing the attached has not already conveyed his thoughts to you, I thought you might find the same of interest.

ROBERT B. ANDERSON
ONE ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10020



June 16, 1970

Dear Mr. Attorney General,

Thank you very much for your giving so generously of your time this morning to visit with us. I can assure you that from my own evaluation the problems of the Middle East rank very high on the list of those difficulties facing not only this nation and the Administration but all of our trading partners and allies around the world.

I was certainly deeply impressed by your own personal knowledge of the affairs as they exist and fully recognize that one should make an affirmative contribution rather than simply pose the problems. In order to be affirmative, I would like to restate as I did this morning the following:

The matter should be handled on the basis of our national interest rather than the national interest of any other country.

The details should be worked out with a minimum of visibility by a person or persons trusted on both sides and who have an awareness of the problems, which can come in my judgment only from long experience in that part of the world.

I believe that the Arabs in their own interest are prepared to make peace if they can do so without direct negotiations and without losing face in their own countries.

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Whatever arrangement is worked out must be packaged, that is, the Israelis must commit to withdraw in an exchange for a commitment for secure boundaries, transit of international waterways, and their other objectives.

If an arrangement is to be successfully and quickly worked out it must from the Arab point of view give evidence of having to some extent been imposed, and allow them some room to verbally complain although they will actually welcome the settlement.

The principal Arab leader that we discussed this morning is more worried in the long run about the Soviets in his country and the influence of the irregular forces than he is of his declared adversary.

You asked whether I thought that a settlement could be made in view of the influence of the guerrillas. I do think so, because I think all of the Government leaders are fully aware that the extent to which the guerrillas are allowed to continue undermines not only the Government of Jordan but all other governments, and could very well cause rebellion against any of them. I believe, therefore, that if an acceptable package can be arrived at with the Israelis that they will collectively impose the settlement upon the guerrillas, largely because they want to save their own established governments.

This may very well be difficult to do so far as those under the influence of China are concerned, but it is my judgment that they are relatively few in number.

Something is going to have to be done to show a recognition of the plight of the Palestinian refugees. This may well include some limited

offer of an opportunity to return, although in my judgment very few would want to return to a Jewish State when it is finally put up to them. Also, I think if opportunities are offered, which do not look charitable, for them to acquire funds by loan to resettle, and if this is done by Arabs and not foreigners, a great many of them will elect to resettle rather than to continue their present plight.

We discussed also the difficulty about Jerusalem, but I want to repeat my conversation with the Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek, who told me while he was here in New York that if Jerusalem is the ultimate question he thinks it can be settled. At least we can expect some degree of cooperation from the Mayor.

It is my judgment that we should realize that the European countries are largely motivated by what they consider to be their own economic interest. I am sure that when you review the last several meetings of the OEDC you will see a growing concern on the part of the Europeans that they have thus far underestimated their fuel requirements and have come to realize that Russia is much less self-sufficient than she was thought to be, and therefore the Europeans are from an economic standpoint more viable toward a settlement that would assure their supplies from North Africa and the Middle East.

I would recommend here that you might want to review recent studies by the Agency as to their beliefs concerning the Soviet oil situation in Russia.

Concerning the possibility of leverage, it seems to be clear that we in the United States would have both economic and military leverage as far as Israel is concerned.

Our leverage insofar as the Arab countries are concerned, for whatever it is worth, in my judgment seems to be:

a. A desire to get rid of the Soviets whose philosophy is completely at odds with that of the Arab countries.

b. A fear that they may be dominated by the Soviets if present circumstances are allowed to continue.

c. A realization that their logical markets are in Europe, the United States, Japan and the Western World. The very fact of transportation makes markets to the Soviet and Iron Curtain countries more difficult. They also have a realization that their principal product, fuel, is of no value until it reaches a market place.

d. All of the Arab leaders in this part of the world realize that they themselves are the most vulnerable targets of the guerrilla forces who capture public imagination, as well as from communist infiltrators so long as this state of uneasy fighting continues. It is my judgment that all of them believe that some peaceful settlement is in their own best interest. If I am correct in this belief, then we ought to utilize our best efforts to help make a settlement before more radical shifts occur which might change their attitude.

You might be interested to know that the signs which have been carried by the students during my visits to Cairo were for the most part signs which read "War or Peace - One or the Other". This would seem to indicate on the part of the younger generation either a desire for full mobilization with what assistance they can get, or peace which will allow them to go about their

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business of building careers. I think this attitude is not lost on the rulers.


I believe also that all of the Arab leaders are worried about the Communist Chinese. This is particularly true of those who border on the Trucial States who are more susceptible to communist take-over than the larger states.

Finally, I am reminded of what was said to me by the Prime Minister of Japan, who thought this was the most important consideration now posed before him on an international basis and he expressed a willingness to me to be of help if he could be.

Please be reassured again, Mr. Attorney General, that if I can be of any assistance to you or the Administration in this or any other matter, I am prepared to do whatever may be required.

I am, with great respect,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Ben Bradlee".

The Honorable John N. Mitchell
Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

REWRITE 126

MEMORANDUM FOR

**THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL**

SUBJECT: Letter from Robert Anderson

**Thank you very much for sending me the copy of
Mr. Anderson's June 16 letter to you. I have talked
with him since then and found his views to be very much
as he stated them to you.**

Henry A. Kissinger

Rewrtn:ms:7/14/70